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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellants have accurately described the nature of the case in their Brief. They have 
also accurately described the procedural history and relevant facts. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The Brief filed by Appellants does not accurately state the issues listed in their Notice 
of Appeal. They have dropped the third issue in their Notice of Appeal, "Whether the trial 
court erred in ruling that the claim for malpractice asserted by the plaintiff's personal 
representative is not barred by the economic loss rule." In its place, they have substituted an 
unrelated issue, "Whether the trial court erred in granting the motion for substitution of 
Bishop, personal representative of Shelton, as plaintiff." 
The dropped issue should be considered no longer at issue, since it has not been 
briefed; and the newly added issue should not be considered, since it was not included in the 
Appellants' Notice of Appeal. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review. 
Appellants accurately describe the standard of review in their Brief. 
B. Shelton's Legal Malpractice Claim Did Not Abate Upon Her Death. 
A due respect for this Court's past decisions on survival of claims leads one to 
conclude that legal malpractice claims should and do survive the death of a claimant. 
However, no direct decision on that issue has been rendered by this Court. Therefore, any 
decision the Court now makes will be entirely within its discretion. 
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As a result, and in hopes of guiding the Court's consideration, Appellee will discuss 
the origin and development of the abatement rule in Idaho, along with its eventual death by 
statute. Appellee will then discuss the legal application of the relevant cases and the newly-
enacted Idaho Code § 5-327. Finally, Appellee will discuss the policies impacted by the 
Court's eventual decision on the survivability oflegal malpractice claims. 
Other than a bare legal argument based on past decisions, none of these items have 
been discussed by Appellants in their Brief. That omission may be because the trend of the 
law in Idaho does not favor the results Appellants seek; or it may be because common sense 
reveals unjust results and improper motivations in a rule that allows a wrongdoer to escape 
liability simply because his former client dies during litigation. 
In any event, not only legal arguments from this Court's past decisions, but also 
policy arguments drawn both from the new LC. § 5-327 and from general common sense 
urge the Court to adopt a rule allowing the survivability of legal malpractice claims after the 
death of the claimant. 
1. History of the non-abatement rule. 
Idaho's law on abatement of tort claims has a long and winding history. The rule was 
apparently adopted to deal with violent personal injuries or felonies. The Supreme Court in 
Doggett v. Boiler Engineering and Supply Co, 93 Idaho 888 (1970) wrote, "The origin and 
effect of the rule and maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona in the early common law 
is obscure. Students of the common law seem to agree that the maxim and rule, if it ever had 
any significant validity, was greatly restricted to trespasses and torts that constituted a felony. 
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It is apparent that the wrongs which later came to be represented by writs of trespass had a 
criminal and later a quasi-criminal origin. See Holdsworth, A History of the English Law, 
Vol. 3." 
Denigrating the rule further, the Supreme Court cited Professor Percy Winfield of 
Columbia University thus: "[I]t may fairly be said of these that with scarcely a single 
exception the maxim was always uttered in circumstances, or with qualifications, that cut 
down its application to the law of torts and usually comes from counsel who are snatching at 
another language in order to screen a hopeless argument of their own." Doggett, at 889. 
The Supreme Court recognized that the rule was originally "pointed toward serious 
intentional wrongs." Doggett, at 889. Yet, over the years, the manner in which the rule was 
defined encouraged its application to all torts, both intentional and negligent. And it was 
enforced in that manner for many decades. It has long been recognized as an anomaly and an 
unfair rule. Yet Idaho courts have continued to honor the rule under the principles of stare 
decisis. 
In the early case of Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 184 P. 477 (1919) the Idaho 
Supreme Court honored the abatement rule for truly personal injuries, but it launched the 
state on the long road to entire elimination of this unfair rule. That decision provided that the 
nature of an action, rather than its form, determines whether an action survives the death of 
the claimant. 
In Kloepfer, six people were harmed financially when the local druggist sold them 
sodium arsenate instead of sodium arsenite to kill the weeds on their farms. The druggist 
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died while the case was on appeal, and his estate argued that the cause of action had died 
with him. 
The Idaho Supreme Court said: 
As a general rule, in the absence of a statute providing otherwise, 
causes of action ex contractu survive, while causes ex delictu do not. 
However, there are well-recognized exceptions to both branches of the rule. 
As was said by the Supreme Court of Virginia in Lee's Administrator v. Hill, 
87 Va. 497, 12 S.E. 1052 24 Am. St. Rep 666: 
The true test is not so much the form of the action, as 
the nature of the cause of action. Where the latter is a tort 
unconnected with contract, and which affects the person only, 
and not the estate, such as assault, libel, slander, and the like, 
there the rule "action personalis," etc., applies. But where, as 
in the present case, the action is founded on a contract, it is 
virtually ex contractu, although nominally in tort, and there it 
survives. 
We have no statutory provision abrogating the common-law 
rule of survival of causes of action above referred to. Applying that rule to 
this case, it may be said that while the action is, in form, ex delicto, the 
cause is, in fact, ex contractu. The injury for which recovery is sought grows 
out of the contract of purchase of sodium arsenate represented by the vendor 
to be sodium arsenite, and the application thereof to the crops of appellant 
and his assignors whereby those specific pieces of property were destroyed. 
These facts distinguish this case from those where recovery is sought for 
injury to the person or for torts resulting in damage to the estate, generally, 
and make these claims assignable and cause them to survive the death of a 
party to the action. 
(Kloepfer, at 418, citations omitted). 
This ruling stood without serious challenge for many years. Then in 1944, the Idaho 
Supreme Court decided lvfoon v. Bullock, 65 Idaho 954, 151 P.2d 765, which presented the 
issue whether a tort claim would survive the death of the tortfeasor. The Supreme Court 
decided it did not. Following the common law rule, the Court decided such a claim would 
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abate. Immediately, the Idaho legislature struck down this ruling by enacting the first 
statutory limit on the abatement rule's applicability, Idaho Code § 5-327. The new law 
provided that an action did not abate upon the death of the tortfeasor. 
A couple decades later, the Supreme Court was faced with a case in which the 
Plaintiff (the injured party) had died during the litigation, Doggett v. Boiler Engineering and 
Supply Co., 93 Idaho 888, 477 P.2d 511 (1970). In that case, the Court looked back at the 
Bullock case and wrote, "[T]o the extent that Bullock suggests that an action ex delicto abates 
upon the death of the plaintiff in a case such as presented herein, it is overruled." Id. at 890. 
Summarizing its decision, the Court wrote, "We have examined the precedents and 
the reasons for the rule of non-survivability of causes of action following the death of a 
plaintiff. We find the precedents unclear and unsatisfactory and the purported reasons for the 
rule virtually non-existent. We suggest therefore that a continuation of such a rule serves no 
purpose." Id. at 892. 
It seemed that the common law rule was dead, and having died, its claim on plaintiffs 
and defendants alike had abated. 
But as it was with Mark Twain, so it was with the common law rule of abatement; 
reports of its death were greatly exaggerated. While it was universally recognized as unfair, 
apparently the concept would not die so easily. The Idaho Supreme Court recognized its 
continued validity in several subsequent decisions, many of which have been cited by 
Appellant. The Court made it clear that despite the language in Doggett, the rule was still 
alive. 
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In December of 2009, the Idaho Court of Appeals was asked to review the rule in 
Craig v. Gellings, 148 Idaho 192 (Ct. App. 2009). The Court of Appeals noted the criticism 
the Supreme Court had laid out in Doggett thus: 
Appellant argues that there is inconsistency and injustice in the current 
state of Idaho's tort law that allows creditors, including tort claimants, to 
pursue their claims against a decedent's estate while disallowing the same 
estate from carrying forward the decedent's personal injury claim against a 
tortfeasor whose wrongful act has depleted the estate's assets. Appellant also 
argues that the interest of a surviving spouse, whose community interest in a 
personal injury claim was preserved by the Doggett decision, is functionally 
equivalent to the interest of an unmarried decedent's estate when a personal 
injury resulted in economic damages to the estate. Because the abatement rule 
does not apply when community property was depleted, the argument goes, it 
should not apply when the estate of an unmarried person has been depleted. 
Appellant claims support for these arguments in comments made by the 
Supreme Court in its Doggett opinion. 
Id. at 194. 
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals did not feel at liberty to reverse the rule, given the 
Supreme Court's adherence to the rule in cases subsequent to Doggett. 
Finally, in 2010, the maxim "The law's mill grinds slowly, but exceedingly fine" was 
proved true when the Idaho legislature completed this long and arduous journey, enacting a 
second paragraph for Idaho Code § 5-327 that ended the abatement doctrine for injured 
parties. Because the common law never did abate claims based on contract, no legislation 
was necessary on that account. 
This history of abatement of tort actions may seem long and unnecessary, since 
Appellee is claiming that her claim is based on contract, but it places the entire doctrine of 
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abatement in context. It is not a favored doctrine and never has been. Thus, its applicability 
should be restricted, not expanded. 
2. Legal Arguments. 
a. Abatement is for cases "unconnected with contract." 
For purposes of legal argumentation, we need to return to Kloepfer v. Forch, supra, 
first. The language of that case that is most important to our understanding of the abatement 
doctrine is the sentence that says, "Where the latter is a tort unconnected with contract, and 
which affects the person only, and not the estate, such as assault, libel, slander, and the like, 
there the rule, 'action personalis,' etc. applies." Id at 418 (emphasis added). 
In other words, in order to abate, the tort must be "unconnected with contract." The 
test is not a "predominance" test, where we see which element is most important. Rather, the 
tort must be "unconnected with contract" for the claim to abate. Where there is any element 
of contract present, as in Kloepfer, then, there is no abatement. This is especially true since 
the abatement doctrine is unfavored generally and has eventually been discarded in its 
entirety. 
The importance of this language becomes apparent in a legal malpractice case, where 
elements of both tort and contract are involved. Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134 
(2003), citing this Court's decision in Johnson v. Jones, l 03 Idaho 702, 706-07 (1982), 
stated, "Legal malpractice actions are an amalgam of tort and contract theories. . . . An 
attorney's duty arises out of the contract between the attorney and his or her client. Johnson 
v Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 704, 652 P.2d 650, 652 (1982) ("The scope of an attorney's 
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contractual duty is defined by the purposes for which the attorney is retained."); Fuller v. 
Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 807 P.2d 633 (1991) (tort of legal malpractice is also a breach of the 
attorney-client contract)." 
And Idaho is not alone in this reasoning. The opening sentence of American 
Jurisprudence 2d, Abatement, Survival, and Revival, Section 84 states, "The failure of an 
attorney to properly represent a client, whether by a breach of duty or by negligence, 
constitutes a breach of contract, and an action based on such breach survives the death of 
either party." Page 164. 
b. Attorney fees cases provide no guidance. 
Appellants have cited Rice v. Litster, 132 Idaho 897,901,980 P.2d 561, 565 (1991) 
(which references other similar cases), in which the Supreme Court referred to an attorney 
malpractice action as a tort. If an attorney malpractice claim is a tort, Appellants conclude, 
then it must abate upon the death of the client. 
What Appellants fail to note, however, is that the Rice language was rendered in a 
case discussing whether attorney fees were allowable in an attorney malpractice case under 
I.C. § 12-120. That section reads as follows: "In any commercial transaction unless 
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee 
to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. The term "commercial transaction" 
is defined to mean all transactions except transactions for personal or household 
purposes ..... " 
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So when the Court called an attorney malpractice action a tort, that statement was in 
the context of attorney fees under J.C. § 12-120. The Court was saying that for purposes of 
determining whether attorney fees were payable, an attorney malpractice action is a tort, 
rather than being "commercial." What mattered to the Court in Rice and its predecessors 
was whether the attorney relationship was a commercial transaction. Finding that it was not 
a commercial transaction, the Court did not need to determine what it was. Thus, the 
language was dicta at best, and in any event inapplicable to the current question. 
It is important to remember that the measure required for abatement is that the action 
be "unconnected to contract" Finding that a transaction is not commercial, or even finding 
calling an action a "tort" is not dispositive under Kloepfer. This is especially true in light of 
Kloepfer 's statement that it is the nature, not the form, of the action that governs survival. 
(It is also helpful to note that in the Rice decision, the cause of action was negligence 
alone. There is no evidence that the plaintiff in that case also asserted a contract cause of 
action, as the Appellee has in this case. So it was accurate to say that the cause of action was 
a "tort.") 
Consequently, the Rice v. Lister line of cases does not shed any useful light on 
whether the claims in attorney malpractice cases abate upon the death of the claimant. 
c. Medical malpractice cases provide no guidance. 
Appellants cite a line of medical malpractice cases, all of which clearly state that 
medical malpractice claims abate upon the death of the plaintiff. They then extend those 
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rulings to attorney malpractice actions. While the original citation is accurate, the extension 
is unwarranted. 
Extending medical malpractice reasoning to attorney malpractice cases fails to 
consider the important differences between actions for medical malpractice and those for 
attorney malpractice. 
First, and most importantly, medical malpractice cases rarely involve a contract at all, 
except perhaps quasi-contracts. Attorney malpractice cases, by contrast, almost always 
involve a written contract. 
Second, a medical malpractice is all about personal injury. In almost every case, the 
doctor has done (or failed to do) something that has caused a physical injury to the claimant. 
Nothing could be more "personal" and relate more directly to the purposes of the abatement 
rule. By contrast, most attorney-client relationships involve the recovery of money damages. 
Failure to perform as provided in the contract very rarely (if ever) results in a physical injury. 
Rather, the damages are always measured in dollars. 
These important differences are highlighted in Corpus Juris Secundum, Abatement 
and Revival, Section 142, where the differences in attorney malpractice and medical 
malpractice are addressed in adjacent sections. Their placement is instructive. The two 
sections read as follows: 
Negligence or malpractice of attorney. Under statutory provision, a 
cause of action for damages arising out of an attorney's malpractice survives 
either his death or the death of the injured party. Under some authority, a 
malpractice cause of action is based upon contract, and, therefore, survives the 
death of the attorney at common law. A cause of action for malpractice may 
also survive since it is considered to involve injury to personal property. 
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Negligence of physician or surgeon. Except under some statutes 
providing that a cause of action and a pending action survive against a 
physician or surgeon for damages for want of skill, negligence, or 
malpractice, the cause of action does not survive regardless of whether it is 
based on contract or tort. 
As a result of these fundamental differences between medical malpractice cases and 
attorney malpractice cases, the cases that indicate medical malpractice cases do not survive 
the death of the injured party should not control the Court's decision in this case. 
d. Attorney-client contracts do more than describe the scope. 
Appellants argue that the attorney-client contract does nothing more than define the 
scope of engagement. They write, "Shelton confuses the contract of engagement of the 
attorney, which defines the scope of the duty owed, with the test for the breach of the duty, 
which is in tort. Appellants' Brief, page 10. 
In a very narrow sense, Appellants may be right. When one thinks of an attorney 
malpractice action, one often pictures a standard of care that was breached. But failing to 
satisfy the standard of care is not the only way an attorney can breach a contract of 
engagement. Consider the contract in question in the current case attached hereto as "Exhibit 
A". 
The first paragraph of the Contingent Fee Contract states, "Attorneys shall represent 
Client in said matter and do all things necessary, appropriate, or advisable, in regard thereto, 
whether the same be by representation in legal proceedings or otherwise." This obligation is 
considerably more expansive than the basic standard of care. Thus, failure to do all the 
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things that were "necessary, appropriate, or advisable," would be a breach of the attorney's 
obligations under the contract, but not necessarily under the applicable standard of care. 
The third paragraph requires the attorney "to advance all necessary fees, costs and 
expenses incidental to handling of said matter." Failure to do so would not necessarily be a 
breach of the applicable standard of care, but it most certainly would be a breach of the 
attorney's duty under the contract. 
So to say that an engagement contract serves only to define the scope of 
representation is not accurate. Breach of any of the terms of a contract of engagement 
entitles the client to enforce the contract-independent of any particular standard of care. 
Thus, an attorney malpractice case is most certainly based on a contract. 
This is graphically portrayed by Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 90 P.3d 884 
(2004), in which the Supreme Court addressed just this issue. It said, "An attorney's duty 
arises out of the contract between the attorney and his or her client. Johnson v. Jones, l 03 
Idaho 702, 704, 652 P .2d 650, 652 (1982) ("The scope of an attorney's contractual duty to a 
client is defined by the purposes for which the attorney is retained. 11); Fuller v. Wolters, 119 
Idaho 415, 807 P.2d 633 (1991) (tort of legal malpractice is also a breach of the attorney~ 
client contract)." Id at 137. 
It would be hard to make a statement any more clear than to say, "An attorney's duty 
arises out of the contract between the attorney and his or her client." The statement 
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absolutely precludes any finding that an attorney malpractice action is "unconnected with 
tort," as Kloepfer requires. 
e. Appellee does state a breach of contract claim. 
Appellants confidently argue that Hayward v. Valley Vista Care Corporation, 136 
Idaho 3 42, 33 P.3d 816 (2001) precludes Appellee from asserting both negligence and 
contract claims. However, Hayward relates specifically to medical malpractice cases and 
has no relationship to attorney malpractice actions. This is especially important in light of 
the fact that the decision was based on a statute that strictly required all actions related to 
medical care to be pursued in the context of the local standard of care. The statute had the 
effect of eliminating contract claims. The Court wrote, 
In the case currently before the Court, the district court found that J.C. § 6-
1012 precluded Alfred from bringing a claim based on a breach of contract theory. 
The district court noted that the claims were for malpractice, regardless of the label 
assigned to them. 
We agree. The basis of Alfred's remaining state court claims pertain to "the 
provision of or failure to provide health care." Consequently, J.C. § 6-1012 and the 
language set forth in Hough, preclude Alfred from bringing a contract claim against 
the nursing home. 
There is no equivalent statute relating to legal malpractice cases. Consequently, 
Hayward does not provide helpful guidance in this context. 
f. Substitution of Bishop was proper. 
For the reasons described above, Shelton's claim did survive her death. 
Consequently, allowing her personal representative to pursue her claims was proper. 
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3. Policy Argument 
There are important reasons, in addition to those stated above, for allowing attorney 
malpractice claims to survive the death of a claimant. 
a. Abatement promotes behavior we don't condone. 
A policy of abatement promotes all kinds of behavior that would damage not only the 
claimant, but the entire legal profession, and even the cause of justice in general. Consider 
the hypothetical case of an attorney who represents an individual in a case against a dentist 
or other professional for medical malpractice. If the medical malpractice resulted in serious 
injury to the client, and the client were in bad medical condition and on the verge of dying, 
the attorney would have almost irresistible motivations in a subsequent legal malpractice 
action to take inappropriate actions he wouldn't otherwise take. 
The attorney would be motivated to delay the resolution of the matter through 
fruitless mediations and discussions without any intention of settling the case. 
The attorney would be motivated to engage in delaying conduct, such as filing 
frivolous interpleader actions, making multiple motions for summary judgment, and 
engaging in unnecessary discovery, all with the hope that the client will die and his claims 
abate before the matter can be resolved. 
Surely this kind of conduct should not be encouraged. But the rule Appellant urges 
this Court to adopt would do just that. 
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b. The rule forces arbitrary decisions. 
If the abatement rule urged by Appellant were adopted by this Court, when would the 
abatement be effective? What if a claimant received a judgment but the matter was still on 
appeal when the claimant died? What if the appeal had been unsuccessful, but execution on 
the judgment had not yet been completed? These questions require an acknowledgment that 
the answer is completely arbitrary. There is no good reason for abatement and no logical 
framework for its enforcement. 
c. The rule is unfair. 
It has been said that there are only two kinds of fair: County Fair and State Fair. Yet 
in deciding important cases such as this, the Court should at least attempt to promote 
fairness. And a doctrine that prevents the estate of a person from recovering against an 
attorney whose negligence has cost the estate hundreds of thousands of dollars, merely 
because the claimant has died, is manifestly unfair. 
d. Abatement promotes unjust enrichment. 
While the money an attorney retains because his former client dies is not unjust 
enrichment in a legal sense, it is not just to allow delaying actions of the type enumerated 
above to benefit the wrongdoer. It certainly is enrichment, and it certainly is unjust. 
e. Abatement results in anomalous consequences. 
Under the rule Appellant advocates, an attorney could recover his hourly fees against 
the estate of a decedent who had been a client, relying on the contract of engagement. But if 
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that same client was pursuing the attorney for negligence and breach of contract but died 
during the litigation, his claim would die with him. The attorney would walk away with his 
fees, while the client's estate would be left without recourse. 
It seems strange that this could actually be the result of Appellants' arguments, but it 
1s m essence what has occurred in this very case. Appellants have recovered over 
$400,000.00 in attorney fees. Yet their client, because of Appellants' breach, would have 
received nothing had she not gone out and hired another attorney. Even then, she was forced 
to pay $270,000.00 plus attorney fees out of her pocket to settle a lien Appellants had 
promised was taken care of. This result cannot be allowed. 
f. Abatement reduces confidence in the law. 
It is precisely this kind of unfair doctrine and the motivations it favors that sours 
public perception of the legal profession and the law that is the very foundation of our 
society. Every opportunity should be sought to make the law fair and just, and this case 
presents an opportunity for this Court to do just that. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons delineated above, Appellee requests that Appellants' request for 
reversal of the district court be denied. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this d_j_ day of March, 2011. 
ELSAESSERJARZABEK 
ANDERSON 
ELLIOTT&, CDONALD, Chtd. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the J L-\ day of March, 2011, I caused to be served two (2) true and 
correct copies of the forego~ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Michael E. Ramsden 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Boulevard 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
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THIS A ~~~~E~T mad~_an_? ent.~r;~d~ ~~~is~ day of Ve'-<,-'-, yr/2 'k,., 2007, by and 
between / ,,..,,,,,, ,..,'-' c, · ,.1 ::,,,7'. \._), 1c: t I '- "'\...J heremafter called 
"Client", and OWENS & CRANDALL, PLLC, Attorn~ys at Law, hereinafter called "Attorneys". 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is mutually agreed and understood as foJlows: 
1. Attorneys shall represent Client in said matter and do all things necessary, 
appropriate, or advisable, in regard thereto, whether the same be by representation in legal 
proceedings or otherwise. 
2. Client agrees to pay Attorneys for professional services thirty-three & one-third 
percent (33-1/3%) of the gross recovery of any and all funds received in settlement without an action 
having been filed in any Court; forty percent (40%) of the gross recovery of any and all funds 
received in s_ettlement or recovered after filing an action in any Court; or forty-five percent (45%) of 
said sums if said matter is settled upon appeal or following post-verdict proceedings, and said sums 
payable to Attorneys for professional services are to he a lien upon any sums received in settlement 
or payment of any said claim, or upon any judgment recovered. 
3. Attorneys agree to advance all necessary fees, costs and expenses incidental to 
handling of said matter. Attorneys shall, however, he reimbursed by Client for any and all costs and 
expenses incurred by Attorneys for and on behalf of Client in the representation of Client's claim, 
cause, or causes of action. Said reimbursement shall he deducted from the client's net recovery if 
sums are collected or received. In the event there is no recovery, Attorneys agree to forfeit all rights 
to rf~cover any cost:;; advanced. 
4. A U.orneys agree to accept said percentage of the amount received as aforesaid as full 
compensation for professional services; and, if there are no sums collected or received in the suit, 
action, compromise, or settlement of said claim or cause or causes of action, Attorneys agree to make 
no charge for professional services. 
5. As Client, you are entitled to he informed on the progress. We will provide reasonably 
prompt responses to your inqmnes. In the event a telephone call or request is not promptly 
answered, please assist us with a repeat call. The file and its progress are open to your inspection at 
any time. 
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6. It is the intent;ion of Attorneys to represent you within the bounds of the law. Every 
reasonable effort will be made to handle your case promptly and efficiently according to the 
prevailing and legal ethical standards. In handling your case, we perform basically two functions: 
(1) assisting you in the decision-making process by giving legal advice, and (2) implementing the 
decision that is made by you, the Client. The ultimate decision belongs to you, the Client. 
7. Client agrees to furnish attorneys with all information relevant to this matter, to 
assist and cooperate in negotiations for settlement or in any court action; to sign, acknowledge, and 
verify all necessary papers, documents, pleadings, or releases in connection with this matter; to be 
present at all proceedings, when requested, and to produce witnesses; and to use Client's best efforts 
to further the purpose of the contingent fee arrangement and Client's claims. Client further agrees 
not to compromise, settle, or offer to compromise or settle this matter in any way without the 
written consent of Attorneys. 
8. Client agrees and hereby authorizes Attorneys to disburse from any funds, any 
medical liens, doctor's liens, etc. received as hereinahove provided all costs and expenses incurred in 
relation to Attorneys' services for Client hereunder and in addition thereto, all witness fees and other 
expenses incurred in the matter, the payment of such expenses to he deducted from Client's 
percentage of recovery as herein provided. 
9. Should it appear to Attorneys at any time that Client's claim does not justify further 
action, or should Attorneys decide for any reason that the firm cannot represent Client any longer, 
Attorneys may withdraw as Attorneys for Client after notice to Client. In this event, Attorneys shall 
receive only a pro-rata share of an ultimate recovery for work done to the date of withdrawal for 
professional services, hut shall he entitled to any and all expenses incurred. Attorneys shall turn over 
to Client all pertinent papers and data prepared or collected by Attorneys for Client in this matter 
after expenses are paid in full. 
DATED and signed this :C.::f dayof_ ,.,JcC6fi'\.k,( ,2007 
CLIENT(s): ATTORNEYS: 
OWENS & CRA DALL, PLLC 
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